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It is well established that conservatives in the U.S. are substantially less likely than liberals to 
accept that climate change is happening and human-caused and are less supportive of policies to 
limit climate change. However, it is likely that ideological differences in climate change beliefs, 
attitudes, and policy preferences are smaller when people have close friends and family members 
who care about climate change. Here we use nine nationally representative survey samples (total 
N = 16,168) to evaluate this claim and test if perceived social consensus predicts a smaller 
difference in climate change beliefs between liberals and conservatives. We find that social 
consensus plays an important role in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences for 
people across the ideological spectrum, but especially among conservatives. These findings 
provide important insights on how to bridge ideological divides in large social dilemmas such as 
climate change. 
 












Perceived Social Consensus Can Reduce Ideological Biases on Climate Change 
 
There is a strong scientific consensus that human-caused climate change is happening and 
a significant threat to human societies and ecosystems worldwide (Cook et al., 2016). Although 
there is consensus among more than 97% of climate scientists that human-caused global 
warming is happening (Cook et al., 2016), many Americans do not believe that climate change is 
happening (30%) or that it is human-caused (42%; Leiserowitz et al., 2018). Political party and 
ideology currently have a strong influence on public opinion formation about climate change. 
For example, while 92% of registered Democratic voters believe climate change is real, only 
51% of registered Republican voters do (Leiserowitz et al., 2018). Including ideology, 95% of 
liberal Democrats believe climate change is real while only 40% of conservative Republicans do. 
Does perceived social consensus—the degree to which people in one’s social group are in 
agreement about an issue—predict the extent to which people believe in climate change? It is 
well-established that the judgments of other people have a powerful influence on our own 
thoughts and behaviors (Asch, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif, 1936), especially when 
people are uncertain about what to think or how to behave (Festinger, 1954). For example, 
people often change their views about other groups to be consistent with the in-group consensus 
about a stereotype (i.e., perceived agreement about the percent of people to whom a certain trait 
or attribute applies, Haslam et al., 1996; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Research in the context of 
climate change has demonstrated the importance of communicating descriptive social norms 
(“most people do x”). For example, van der Linden (2015) finds that perceived social consensus 
on the issue is a key determinant of public risk perceptions of climate change. Similarly, many 
studies show that descriptive norms can encourage conformity in energy conservation (Allcot, 
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2011; Schultz et al., 2007) and other sustainable behaviors, such as  recycling (Cialdini, Reno, & 
Kallgren, 1990), towel reuse (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; van der Linden & 
Chryst, 2017), meat consumption (Sparkman & Walton, 2017), and sustainable transportation 
(Kormos, Gifford, & Brown, 2014).  
Yet, what remains less clear in the context of climate change—which is characterized by 
large intergroup conflict in the United States—is the extent to which perceived in-group 
consensus is associated with belief formation and policy support. For example, some research 
shows that exaggerated perceptions of political polarization on climate change can lead to false 
norms of partisan opposition (Van Boven, Ehret, & Sherman, 2018). The perception of a positive 
social consensus in one’s close social network might help attenuate such intergroup pressures. In 
other words, are conservatives and liberals more likely to believe in climate change when a) they 
perceive a social in-group consensus about either what to believe (i.e., climate change is human-
caused) or b) about which pro-climate policies to support? This question is of theoretical and 
practical importance considering that people often misperceive what others around them believe 
(e.g., Jost, 2018; Mildenberger & Tingley, 2017). 
Misperceptions of Social Consensus 
 Because the beliefs of others are extremely influential to one’s own beliefs, the 
misperception of what others believe presents a crucial barrier to action on climate change. For 
example, if people incorrectly believe most other people do not believe global warming is 
happening, then they likely will not believe it is happening either, and will be much less likely to 
perceive global warming as a serious risk or support policy action to reduce global warming. 
Mildenberger and Tingley (2017) investigated the extent to which people misperceived global 
warming beliefs in the United States and China. They found that participants in both countries 
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tended to underestimate the extent to which people in their own country believe global warming 
is happening, human caused, and that most scientists believe human-caused global warming is 
happening. In a follow-up experiment, the researchers found that exposing United States 
respondents to information about the true proportion of Chinese people’s pro-environment 
beliefs (much higher than that of the U.S.) led U.S. respondents to significantly increase their 
support for a global climate treaty. 
 The misperception of social consensus is especially consequential in the U.S. because a 
significant portion of the American population does not believe global warming is happening, 
particularly conservatives and Republicans (Leiserowitz et al., 2018). Recent research 
demonstrates the importance of in-group messengers in shifting people’s normative beliefs about 
climate change. For example, Ehret, Van Boven, and Sherman (2018) found that respondents 
were more likely to support a pro-climate policy when it was endorsed by elites from their own 
party, and this effect was mediated by perceptions of social consensus. That is, when Republican 
respondents, for example, saw that a member of the Republican elite endorsed the policy, they 
increased their perceptions that other Republicans were also supporting the policy, and therefore 
increased their own support for it. 
 Additionally, inaccurate beliefs about what others believe can lead to pluralistic 
ignorance whereby most people think that others hold the opposing viewpoint when they do not, 
leading people to self-silence. This phenomenon has been demonstrated across a broad range of 
topics including alcohol consumption (Prentice & Miller, 1993), sexual behavior (Lambert, 
Kahn, & Apple, 2003), as well as climate change beliefs (Geiger, & Swim, 2016; Leviston, 
Walker, & Morwinski, 2013).  
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 Perhaps even more importantly, little is known about the role of social consensus in one’s 
close social group: family and friends. A large social psychological literature shows that close 
relationships are especially influential to one’s beliefs. For example, Shared Reality Theory 
posits that people are motivated to tune their views to those of close others (i.e., share reality) in 
order to fulfill fundamental motives to understand the world and to affirm their sense of 
belonging (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Hardin & Conley, 2001; also see Baumeister & Leary, 
1995). Because 61% of Americans say the issue of global warming is at least somewhat 
personally important, but 69% say they rarely or never talk about it with family and friends 
(Maibach et al., 2016), there is a need to understand the role of close relationships in people’s 
global warming beliefs.  
Ideology and Social Consensus 
 Further, does perceived social consensus predict beliefs about climate change equally for 
people across the political spectrum? Because the need to identify and affiliate with others is a 
fundamental psychological drive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), one might expect that the role of 
social influence in views about climate change is equivalent across the ideological spectrum. 
However, a large literature has identified core psychological and personality differences between 
liberals and conservatives (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; 
Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Jost, 2017; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Hardin, 
2018; Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2014), suggesting that social consensus might play a more 
important role among conservatives.  
Several studies find that conservatives place greater value on conformity and in-group 
loyalty than do liberals (Caprara et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2009; Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2018; 
Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011). For example, researchers investigated the extent to which 
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liberal and conservative differences observed in previous research represented genuine 
differences in “basic personal values”—defined as “cognitive representations of desirable, trans-
situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or 
group” (Piurko et al., 2011, p. 538). The researchers analyzed 17 countries on the value of 
conformity. The results were almost unanimously consistent: in 16 of 17 countries, the value of 
conformity predicted a conservative political orientation.  
Additionally, research on Moral Foundations Theory documents ideological differences 
in valuing in-group loyalty (Graham et al., 2009). Several studies using different methods find 
that conservatives more strongly value in-group loyalty than do liberals. Conservatives saw in-
group loyalty as more morally relevant than liberals did, and in an additional study, were less 
willing than liberals to violate in-group loyalty when given a hypothetical moral conflict (van der 
Linden & Panagopoulos, 2019). 
Although related, ideology is not the same as political party. However, ideology and 
political party voter registration are strongly correlated (Panagopoulos & van der Linden, 2016). 
In their study of voters in the 2001 Italian national election, Caprara and colleagues (2006) found 
that valuing conformity predicted voting for center-right over center-left candidates in the 
election. In the U.S., political polarization in the past two decades has led to even greater overlap 
between ideology and political party (Pew Research Center, 2017; also see Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 2006). That is, 95% of Republicans are more conservative than the median Democrat 
and 97% of Democrats are more liberal than the median Republican. 
Of particular importance to the current study, conservatives and Republicans show a 
stronger desire than liberals and Democrats to adopt and share the same views with like-minded 
others (e.g., Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Jost et al., 2018; Stern et al., 2014). For example, recent 
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research showed participants an article highlighting misinformation about climate change and 
then randomly assigned them to read a correction of the information that came from NASA 
scientists, Democratic senators, or Republican senators (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018). The study 
found that when the message came from Republican senators, Republican respondents 
significantly increased their beliefs in the scientific consensus on climate change, that climate 
change is human-caused, and that it is an important problem. Democratic respondents did not 
update their beliefs when the message came from Democratic senators. The results suggest that 
Republicans are more responsive to messages from their in-group than Democrats are. 
Additionally, while prior research has shown that perceived consensus among 
ideologically-neutral outgroups, such as scientists, can help correct misperceptions and neutralize 
belief polarization (Goldberg et al., 2019; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der 
Linden et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), other research demonstrates that conservatives are often 
more influenced by the source of a message than the message itself (Jost, & Krochik, 2014). 
Thus, based on a large body of previous research, we expect conservatives will have significantly 
lower pro-climate beliefs than liberals, and this ideological difference will be significantly 
smaller for people in social groups that care about climate change (i.e., high social consensus). 
Because political ideology and political party are highly related measures, we expect the same 
relationship for political party. That is, we test whether Republicans will have significantly lower 
pro-climate beliefs than Democrats, and whether this partisan difference will be significantly 
smaller for people with high social consensus in their close social group. 




 To address the current research questions, we draw primarily on data collected through 
the Climate Change in the American Mind (CCAM) project, which has conducted biannual 
nationally representative surveys from 2008 until the present. Data from this project are used to 
track key climate change beliefs over time (e.g., whether it is happening and human-caused; see 
Leiserowitz et al., 2018), gauge public opinion on relevant policies, and answer theory-based 
research questions. All samples from CCAM are nationally representative probability samples. 
Reports for each wave of CCAM are available online and contain demographic information for 
that specific sample and demonstrate that the data closely resemble United States population 
parameters (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/). As an additional robustness 
check, this study also includes an additional large national dataset recruited from Qualtrics 
Panels (see sampling procedures in the Participants section). 
Inclusion Criteria 
 We included all CCAM survey waves that included a variable measuring social 
consensus, plus the Qualtrics survey, leading to a total of nine datasets. Including all datasets 
across four different social consensus variables offered the advantage of larger sample sizes as 
well as preliminary tests of which conceptualizations of social consensus variables are strongest 
in predicting global warming beliefs as a function of political ideology (see Supplementary Table 
1 for information on all variables included). Additionally, because of the importance of 
replicability and reproducibility of scientific findings (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), it is 
important to conduct direct and conceptual replications. Direct replications validate the 
phenomenon of interest and conceptual replications validate the underlying theoretical concept 





The total number of respondents was N = 16,168. Data for eight of the nine surveys used 
in this paper were collected via biannual waves of nationally representative surveys on climate 
change (n = 9,867). The number of respondents for each variable is available in Supplementary 
Table 1. Respondents were American adults age 18 and older and recruited from GfK’s 
Knowledge Panel using probability sampling. Potential respondents were recruited using either 
random-digit dialing or address-based sampling techniques that cover nearly all resident phone 
numbers and addresses in the United States. Respondents who were recruited but did not have 
Internet access were loaned computers with access to the Internet, enabling their participation. 
We used an additional national dataset of American adults (18+ years old), which was collected 
from Qualtrics panels (Qualtrics LLC, Provo, UT) in 2015 (n = 6,301). The sample used quotas 
to reflect the United States population for gender, age, region, education, and political party. All 
surveys and informed consent to participate in each survey were self-administered online by the 
respondent. All studies were approved by the Yale University Institutional Review Board and all 
procedures were carried out in accordance with their regulations. 
Materials and Procedure 
The data were drawn from eight waves of nationally representative surveys and one wave 
from a national survey (total N = 16,168) conducted between 2008 and 2017. In each survey, 
participants answered questions regarding global warming, including beliefs (e.g., do you think 
that global warming is happening?), policy preferences (e.g., how much do you support or 
oppose the following policies; “regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant”), norm perceptions, 
political party, and ideology (1 = Very liberal, 5 = Very conservative). A full description of all 
questions used in this study is listed in Supplementary Table 1.  
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Participants were asked one of four different questions about their perception of the 
social consensus on climate change within their group of friends and family, depending on the 
wave of survey. For example, “...what percentage of people who are important to you (friends, 
family, etc.) believe that human-caused global warming is happening?” (0%-100%) and “How 
important is it to your family and friends that you take action to reduce global warming?” (1 = 
Not at all important, 5 = Extremely important). Several dependent variables measured 
respondents’ belief that climate change is happening and human-caused, their level of worry 
about climate change, and support for climate policies (see Supplementary Table 1). All 
variables were standardized and then combined into a single dataset (see details below).  
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
We use multiple regression to 1) evaluate the relationship between perceived social 
consensus and climate change beliefs, worry, and policy preferences, and 2) test if greater 
perceived social consensus is associated with a smaller ideological gap in climate change beliefs, 
worry, and policy preferences between liberals and conservatives. All regression models 
controlled for age, gender, and education, although results were the same whether or not these 
covariates were included in the models. Primary results are reported in the main text whereas full 
regression tables with results of covariates are included in the supplementary information. 
Because our dataset was comprised of nine waves of survey data, included four different 
social consensus questions, and there were no a priori predictions about which social consensus 
questions would yield the strongest results, we standardized all variables and combined all 
datasets. This was possible for the three primary dependent variables: the belief that global 
warming is happening, human-caused, and worry about global warming. For the remaining 
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dependent measures, we use data that were only available in select waves (seven waves for 
policy questions; one wave for the need for public action). In the following section, we explore 
differences in effect size based on the different social consensus questions used in different 
survey waves. To do this, we conducted random effects meta-analyses to determine the effect 
size across all four questions about social consensus. Next, we considered an alternative 
hypothesis and conducted two random effects meta-analyses to determine which model best 
explains the variability in the data. 
Primary Analyses 
First, we examined the relationship between ideology and each of three measures that 
were available in all nine survey waves (N = 16,168): belief that global warming is happening, 
human-caused, and worry about global warming. As expected, ideology had a significant 
negative association with the belief that global warming is happening, (b = -.39, SE = .01) p < 
.001, 95% CI [-.40, -.38], human-caused, (b = -.36, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.37, -.35], and 
worry, (b = -.42, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.43, -.41]. Policy questions were included in seven 
of nine survey waves (total ns > 8,200; see Supplementary Table 1 for exact sample sizes and 
years included). As expected, ideology had a significant negative association with support for 
regulating carbon as a pollutant, (b = -.39, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.41, -.38], as well as 
support for regulating utilities, (b = -.36, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.38, -.35]. Only the 
Qualtrics sample (n = 6,301) included a question that asked participants whether they think 
people should be doing more or less to reduce global warming (i.e., the need for public action). 
As expected, ideology had a significant negative association with the need for public action, (b = 
-.31, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.33, -.28] (see Supplementary Tables 2A-2F). 
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Next, we examined the unique effects of perceived social consensus while also 
controlling for ideology. Social consensus was significant and positively associated with the 
belief that global warming is happening, (b = .36, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.34, .37], human 
caused, (b = .36, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.34, .37], a stronger sense of worry about global 
warming, (b = .41, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.40, .42], support for carbon regulation, (b = .24, 
SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.22, .26], regulation of utilities, (b = .22, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI 
[.20, .24], as well as the need for public action, (b = .53, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.51, .55] 
(see Supplementary Tables 3A-3F). 
 To test whether perceived social consensus is associated with a smaller ideological gap in 
climate change beliefs, worry, and policy preferences, we tested the ideology × perceived social 
consensus interaction for each dependent variable. The PROCESS macro in SPSS was used to 
parse all interactions (Hayes, 2013). The expected interaction was significant in predicting 
whether participants believed global warming is happening (b = .11, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI 
[.09, .12]. For people with low social consensus (-1SD), ideology (i.e., higher = more 
conservative) had a negative and significant relationship with the belief that global warming is 
happening, (b = -.39, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.41, -.37], and this relationship was negative 
and significant but substantially weaker (less than half in magnitude) for people with high social 
consensus (+1SD), (b = -.18, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.20, -.16]. The interaction was also 
significant for the belief that global warming is human caused, (b = .09, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% 
CI [.07, .10]. For people with low social consensus (-1SD), ideology was significant and negative 
in predicting belief in human causation, (b = -.34, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.36, -.32], and 
this relationship remained negative and significant but again was less than half in magnitude for 
people with high social consensus (+1SD), (b = -.16, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.18, -.14]. The 
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ideology × perceived social consensus interaction was significant for worry, (b = .06, SE = .01) p 
< .001, 95% CI [.05, .07], such that ideology was negative and significant for people with low 
social consensus, (b = -.33, SE = ..01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.35, -.31], but substantially less so for 
people with high social consensus, (b = -.22, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.24, -.20] (see Figures 
1 and 2 and Supplementary Tables 4A-4F). 
Figure 1. Global warming beliefs (happening and human causation) as a function of ideology 
and social consensus. Plots present standardized regression coefficients adjusted for age, gender, 
and education. Includes all nine survey waves. 
 
Figure 2. Worry and support for CO2 regulation as a function of ideology and social consensus. 
Plots present standardized regression coefficients adjusted for age, gender, and education. Worry 




Next, we tested the same interaction predicting policy preferences as well as the need for 
public action. The interaction was significant for policy support for regulating carbon as a 
pollutant, (b = .07, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .09], where the relationship between 
ideology and policy support was significant and negative for people with low social consensus, 
(b = -.41, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.44, -.38], but this relationship was weaker for people 
with high social consensus, (b = -.26, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.29, -.24]. The significant 
interaction and same pattern of results emerged for policy support for regulating utilities, (b = 
.05, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .07]. Conservatives were significantly less supportive of the 
policy than liberals when they perceived low social consensus, (b = -.35, SE = .01) p < .001, 
95% CI [-.38, -.32], but this relationship was substantially weaker for people who perceived high 
social consensus, (b = -.25, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.28, -.22]. Finally, we replicated this 
same relationship for the need for public action with a significant ideology × perceived social 
consensus interaction, (b = .10, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .11], whereby ideology 
predicted lower declared need for public action among people with low social consensus, (b = -
.28, SE = .02) p < .001, 95% CI [-.31, -.25], and this relationship was much weaker among those 
with high social consensus, (b = -.08, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [-.11, -.06]. 
To test if this pattern of results was consistent when examining political party, we used 
the same model to test the party (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican) × perceived social consensus 
interaction for each dependent variable. All effects remained significant with the same pattern of 
results as those reported for ideology. For example, Republicans were significantly less likely 
than Democrats to believe global warming is happening when they perceived low social 
consensus, but this difference was substantially diminished when they perceived high social 
consensus (see Supplementary Figure 1 for a forest plot of all interaction effect sizes).  
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Exploring Differences Among Social Consensus Questions 
 Because we had no a priori predictions about which social consensus questions would be 
strongest in predicting weaker ideological biases against climate change, we tested each question 
individually to explore differences in the magnitude of the relationship for each social consensus 
question. Models were restricted to dependent measures that were in all datasets: the belief that 
global warming is happening, human-caused, and worry about global warming. Because our 
primary effect of interest is the ideology × perceived social consensus interaction, which denotes 
the extent to which social consensus predicts weaker ideological biases against climate change, 
our analyses compare the effect sizes of the interaction terms. For ease of comparison, and to 
determine the overall effect size estimate across social consensus questions for the corresponding 
dependent measure, we used the JASP statistical software program to conduct random effects 
meta-analyses and displayed the results in forest plots in Figures 3A-3C. Across all dependent 
measures, the strongest social consensus effect was for whether participants believed that their 
friends and family thought it was important for the respondent to take action to reduce global 
warming. In the discussion section we speculate about what might explain the variability in 











Comparing social consensus effect sizes for the belief that global warming is happening 
 
Note. The size of the square for each effect size represents the weight of the corresponding effect 
size in determining the overall effect size estimate (as a result of sample size and the width of the 
corresponding confidence interval). Effect sizes for each social consensus variable are the 
standardized regression coefficients for the ideology × perceived social consensus interaction 
term. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Covariates = age, gender, and education. 
 
Figure 3B 
Comparing social consensus effect sizes for the belief that global warming is human-caused  
 





Comparing social consensus effect sizes for worry about global warming  
 
Note. The same model is repeated. 
 
The Effect of Survey Wave 
 Because data were collected in years ranging from 2008 to 2017, it is necessary to 
explore whether our primary analyses of interest vary depending on survey year. Thus, we tested 
the ideology × perceived social consensus × survey wave interaction treating wave as a 
continuous variable. In predicting whether participants believed global warming is happening, 
the three-way interaction was significant, (b = .01, SE = .001) p < .001, 95% CI [.003, .007], 
such that the ideology × social consensus interaction got stronger as survey wave got closer to 
the present day. For example, the ideology × social consensus interaction that was significant for 
data collected in the earliest waves (one wave in 2008 and two waves in 2010), (b = .07, SE = 
.01) p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .09], gets stronger for data collected in later waves (two in 2011 and 
two in 2012), (b = .10, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .11], and then gets even stronger for data 
collected closest to the present (one in 2015 and one in 2017), (b = .13, SE = .01) p < .001, 95% 
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CI [.11, .15]. The three-way interactions were also significant for the belief that global warming 
is human caused, (b = .004, SE = .001) p = .002, 95% CI [.001, .006], as well as for worry about 
global warming, (b = .004, SE = .001) p < .001, 95% CI [.002, .006]. The pattern of results was 
the same for all three dependent measures, although the effect of survey wave was very small. 
Testing an Alternative Hypothesis 
The hypotheses reported in this paper propose that ideological biases are weaker because 
of social influence (i.e., Social Influence hypothesis), particularly because conservatives are 
more motivated to conform to the views of like-minded others. It is plausible instead, however, 
that people who believe climate change is happening, human-caused, worry about it, and support 
climate change mitigation policies also think their social network members feel the same way. 
That is, people may project their own views onto their social group members (i.e., Social 
Projection Hypothesis). Thus, for people who have pro-climate beliefs and policy preferences, 
liberals and conservatives alike would believe that their social group members also care about 
climate change. On the other hand, for people who do not have pro-climate beliefs, conservatives 
should believe more than liberals that their friends and family members also do not have pro-
climate beliefs. Put simply, if conservatives are indeed projecting their climate change beliefs 
onto friends and family, then they should believe their friends and family have pro-climate 
beliefs when the respondents themselves do more than when they do not.  
To test this hypothesis, we used standardized variables from the combined dataset of all 
nine survey waves in a multiple regression analysis to test the interaction between ideology and 
each climate change belief (e.g., happening, human-caused, etc.) predicting perceived social 
consensus. Next, we ran two random effects meta-analyses, which allowed for side-by-side 
comparisons of Social Influence and Social Projection models for each dependent measure (see 
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Figure 4). The Social Projection models are significant in all but one case. However, in all model 
comparisons, the Social Influence model is better at explaining the variability in the 
corresponding dependent measure. Additionally, the meta-analytic effect is significantly stronger 
for the Social Influence model than for the Social Projection model because the confidence 
intervals do not overlap (Cumming, 2009). We revisit the possibility of both causal pathways in 
the discussion section. 
Figure 4 
Random effects meta-analyses for Social Influence (left panel) and Social Projection models 
(right panel). 
 
Note. The size of the square for each effect size represents the weight of the corresponding effect 
size in determining the overall effect size estimate. Effect sizes for each variable are the 
standardized regression coefficients for the ideology × perceived social consensus interaction 
term for each measure. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Covariates = age, gender, 
and education. 
 
Gauging the Size of the Conservative Population with High Social Consensus 
 Gauging the size of the conservative population that perceives high social consensus has 
high practical importance because it can help 1) identify and mobilize pro-climate action 
conservatives and 2) encourage people to talk about global warming more frequently to foster 
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higher social consensus among conservative family and friends. To measure the size of this 
population, we use our most recent nationally representative data (June 2017; n = 1,118) and 
weight it to match census parameters on age, gender, race/ethnicity, geographic region, 
education, and income. We find that about 35% of conservative survey participants have family 
and friends that think it is at least moderately important that the respondent take action on global 
warming. Thus, these results should apply to a substantial portion of the American population. 
Discussion 
Together, these results suggest an important role of perceived social consensus in climate 
change beliefs and support for mitigation policies. Perceived social consensus is associated with 
a higher percentage of people that believe climate change is real and human-caused. The same 
pattern emerges for worry and climate policy support. Perceived social consensus remains a 
strong predictor even when controlling participant ideology as well as demographic variables.  
Importantly, perceived social consensus appears to be particularly important for 
predicting the views of conservatives. This is consistent with prior research that finds 
conservatives place greater value on in-group loyalty, conformity, and desire to identify with 
others (Caprara et al., 2006; Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2018; Stern et al., 2014). In particular, these 
findings suggest the importance of norm-perception as a means for social change, as 
(mis)perceptions of group norms are often easier to change than deep-seated private beliefs and 
worldviews (Tankard & Paluck, 2017; van der Linden et al., 2018). 
Additionally, we observed the same pattern of results when examining political party. 
That is, for people who perceived low social consensus, Republicans had significantly lower pro-
climate beliefs than did Democrats, but this difference was substantially smaller for people who 
perceived high social consensus. These findings, together with those on ideology, have 
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implications for how to use social identity as a messaging strategy. For example, while there is 
substantial overlap between those who are conservative and those who identify with the 
Republican party, it is likely that some people more strongly identify with one of the two groups 
(i.e., conservatives vs. Republicans). Thus, it would be fruitful for future research to investigate 
the extent to which appeals to people’s conservative versus Republican identity are more 
effective in communicating about climate change. 
We also used random effects meta-analyses to explore the extent to which some measures 
of social consensus were stronger than others in predicting weaker ideological biases. First, 
results from social consensus questions that asked about friends and family were clearly stronger 
than the question that only included friends. Second, and perhaps more interesting, results 
consistently showed that ideological biases became weakest (i.e., interaction was strongest) when 
respondents perceived that their friends and family thought it was important for the respondent to 
take action on global warming. These findings suggest that this conceptualization of social 
consensus might be most intuitively salient to participants (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990). That is, it 
might be easier to bring to mind what one’s family and friends find important, as opposed to 
what they are doing or what percentage of one’s social group believe human-caused global 
warming is happening. While this explanation is plausible and deserves attention in future 
research, the available data in the current study make it difficult to draw firm conclusions on 
which way of measuring social consensus is most informative. For example, the strongest effects 
were observed in the most recent survey waves, thus it is difficult to know whether the stronger 
social consensus results were due to data being closer to the present or because this 
conceptualization of social consensus is most informative. 
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Further, the confounding effects of survey wave and social consensus questions make it 
difficult to interpret the effect of survey wave. We observed that the ideology × perceived social 
consensus interaction got stronger as survey wave got closer to the present day. This makes sense 
in light of the increase in ideological and partisan polarization in the United States (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). That is, as people become more aligned with their ideological and 
partisan in-groups, social consensus can become even more predictive of weaker ideological 
biases on climate change when biases are larger to begin with. However, we view this finding as 
preliminary because of the reasons described above as well as the relatively small effect of 
survey wave.  
It is important to note the limitations of the current study. First, these data cannot 
demonstrate causality. Because the data are not experimental, we take the next best approach and 
attempt to rule out plausible alternative explanations. The primary alternative explanation for the 
current data is that conservatives who believe climate change is happening, human-caused, worry 
about it, and support mitigation policy are predisposed to believe that the rest of their own social 
group feels the same way, or perhaps choose friends that feel the same way. To compare the 
support for this Social Projection hypothesis and the Social Influence hypothesis (i.e., the 
primary hypothesis in the current paper), we conducted two random effects meta-analyses to 
determine which models better explained the variability in the data. Results consistently showed 
more support for the Social Influence hypothesis and showed that the meta-analytic effect was 
significantly stronger than for the Social Projection hypothesis. Additionally, experimental 
findings demonstrate that manipulating perceived scientific consensus can shift private beliefs 
and support for action (van der Linden et al., 2015), and that climate change messages from in-
group Republicans are seen as more persuasive (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018), which increases 
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confidence in the Social Influence explanation. Importantly, however, the majority of the effects 
were significant for the Social Projection models. Thus, it is plausible that causality among these 
variables is bidirectional, albeit at different magnitudes. It would be fruitful for future research to 
investigate both causal pathways in experimental or longitudinal research. 
Importantly, although establishing causality has important practical implications for 
applied research, the contribution of the current findings is not entirely contingent on 
demonstrating causality. For example, we used our most recent data, weighted to census 
parameters, to show that more than one third of conservatives perceived at least moderately high 
social consensus about climate change among their friends and family. From a strategic 
standpoint, this is important for identifying conservatives that are likely to be pro-climate, which 
is a crucial step towards encouraging them to take action. 
An important consideration in interpreting the current findings is the extent to which the 
results observed here are driven by ideological differences in conformity and in-group loyalty. 
That is, the results may be explained by the larger opportunity for conservatives’ beliefs to vary 
as a function of social consensus rather than fundamental differences in ideological values. 
Although the current data cannot definitively answer this question, a large literature shows that 
—compared to liberals—conservatives have a stronger motivation to affiliate with in-group 
members. This ideological asymmetry is evident in basic differences in life values across 
individuals from many different countries (Piurko et al., 2011), in moral judgments (Graham et 
al., 2009), and even in consumer behavior (Fernandez & Mandel, 2014; for a review see Jost, 
2017). Thus, the current findings are consistent with a large body of previous research 
documenting ideological asymmetries.  
SOCIAL	CONSENSUS,	IDEOLOGY,	AND	CLIMATE	CHANGE	
	 25	
An unanswered question that remains in this line of research is what level of agreement is 
perceived as a “persuasive” consensus. That is, it remains unclear whether a majority of one’s 
friends and family members (e.g., 51%) qualifies as a majority consensus or whether people only 
perceive high social consensus when it is extremely high like the consensus on climate change 
observed among climate scientists (i.e., 97%). The psychological “threshold” for what level of 
consensus is regarded as persuasive likely depends on a person’s experience and motivations. 
For example, for someone who is motivated to reject climate science, it may take extremely high 
consensus to move their beliefs. Whereas for someone who is simply disengaged from the issue 
of climate change, it may only take a slim majority to move their beliefs. Future research should 
address these open questions and determine the extent to which social context and individual 
differences moderate the effects of different levels of social consensus. 
Another avenue by which to extend the current research is by measuring the political 
identity of people’s close friends and family. Those data were not available in the current study, 
but likely would contribute to a greater understanding of the boundaries of social consensus 
effects. Social consensus should be more influential when, for example, conservatives are part of 
a social network of pro-climate conservatives than when they are part of a network of pro-
climate liberals.  
The results from this study have important practical implications. For example, from a 
social identity perspective, most conservatives likely affiliate and identify more strongly with 
their own friends and family than conservatives as a broad category (i.e., outside their own social 
group) because people in their immediate social network are more important to their daily lives 
and identity. Thus, if their own friends and family care about climate change, they are more 
likely to care as well. These results align with the suggestion that communicators could try to 
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engage people based on non-political identities (Pearson, Schuldt, & Romero-Canyas, 2016), 
such as hunting and fishing, or parenting and grandparenting, which may enable more 
constructive conversations about climate change than partisan discourse. 
The research reported here underscores the importance of encouraging people, especially 
conservatives, to talk about climate change and their support for climate policies. Most 
Americans say the issue of global warming is personally important, yet rarely hear about it from 
their friends and families (Maibach et al., 2016). This dynamic can lead to lower climate policy 
support simply because people may mistakenly believe that other important people in their lives 
do not care about climate change. Thus, our results highlight the importance of breaking the 
silence on climate change (Maibach et al., 2016). 
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